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Abstract
This paper presents an overlapping generations model with technology
choice and imperfect financial markets, and examines the evolution of income
distribution in economic development. The model shows that improvements in
financial infrastructure facilitate economic development both by raising the ag-
gregate capital-labor ratio and by causing a technological shift to more capital-
intensive technologies. While a higher capital-labor ratio under a given tech-
nology reduces inequality, a technological shift can lead to a concentration of
the economic rents among a smaller number of agents. We derive the condition
under which an improvement in financial infrastructure actually decreases the
average utility of agents.
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1 Introduction
One important aspect of economic development is that less productive technologies,
which are often labor-intensive, are replaced with more productive ones. However,
major technological shifts have often been accompanied by conflicts among individ-
uals or diﬀerent parties in the economy. Mokyr (1990) documents that before and
during the Industrial Revolution, there were numerous examples of anti machinery
agitation in Britain. In 1768, 500 sewers attacked a mechanical sawmill in London.
In 1792, a Manchester-based firm that pioneered Cartwright’s power loom was burnt
down. Between 1811 and 1816, the “Luddite” riots occurred in the Midlands and
the industrial counties. Also in continental Europe, resistance came from guilds of
skilled artisans. In 1780, anti-machinery vandalism occurred in the city of Rouen
and then spread to Paris, destroying spinning machines imported from Britain and
locally made devices such as pitchfork making machines. These episodes clearly show
that not everyone benefits from technological shifts.
This paper focuses on the eﬀects of technological shifts on income distribution
and welfare. Any resistance to a new technology suggests that there is a group
of agents who earns economic rents that are related to the existing technology. It
is popularly believed that this fact actually indicates that technological shifts are
desirable for the economy as a whole; that is, while some agents may lose their
vested interests, improved productivity of new technologies can be enjoyed by all
agents in the economy. This view suggests that the degree of inequality would fall
when a new technology is adopted after overcoming the resistance to it.
However, historical evidence shows that this is not always the case. For example,
between 1759 and 1801, the nominal Gini index rose from 52.2 to 59.3 in England,
when the textile and many other industries shifted from cottage to manufacturing
technologies (Lindert 2000). Further, Morrison (2000) argues that in continental
Europe (e.g., France and Germany), the income share of the top decile increased five
to ten percent in the mid-nineteenth century, making this period reach the peak of the
Kuznets curve. If the rise in inequality implies a further concentration of economic
rents among a smaller number of agents, the welfare eﬀect of a technological shift is
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no longer obvious.
In this paper, we theoretically examine the process of economic development and
technological shift, as well as their eﬀects on income distribution and welfare, by con-
structing an overlapping generations model with multiple technologies and imperfect
financial markets. In particular, this study focuses on financial infrastructure, such as
legal and accounting systems, because recent studies have suggested that financial in-
frastructure is closely related to both technological shifts and income distribution. La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) provided convincing
evidence that the development of financial markets is strongly influenced by the fi-
nancial infrastructure that determines the enforceability of financial contracts. Since
“financial revolutions” have often preceded major technological shifts (e.g., Sylla
2002),1 this evidence justifies the consideration of financial markets as an important
source of technological shift. Also, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Matsuyama (2000)
theoretically demonstrated that limited enforcement of financial contracts gives rise
to credit rationing, which limits the number of entrepreneurs who earn economic
rents. This paper incorporates multiple technologies with diﬀerent capital intensities
into their settings, and examines how technological shifts aﬀect income distribution.
Our analysis reveals that improvements in the financial infrastructure facilitate
economic development in two ways, which have contrasting implications for income
distribution. First, as long as the same technology is used, improved financial infras-
tructure makes credit accessible to an increased number of agents, which raises the
aggregate capital-labor ratio and hence per capita income. In this case, the amount of
1Sylla (2002) reports, “The Dutch financial revolution had occurred by the first decades of the
seventeenth century, before the Dutch Golden Age... The British financial revolution in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, before the English industrial revolution. The U.S. finan-
cial revolution occurred ..., before the U.S. economy accelerated its growth in the ‘statistical dark
age’ of the early nineteenth century.” He also notes, “In the early Meiji era of the 1870s and 1880s,
Japan had a financial revolution ... Once their financial revolution was in place, the Japanese were
oﬀ and running.” See also Dickson (1967) for similar arguments. Levine (1997, 2005) provides an
extensive survey on the role of a country’s financial system in economic development. Christopoulos
and Tsionas (2004) shows that the causality runs from finance to economic development and not
vice versa.
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rent received by each entrepreneur declines and the income of wage earners increases.
Consequently, inequality falls and welfare improves.
The second way in which improvements in financial infrastructure facilitate eco-
nomic development is through a technological shift. While the economy’s financial
infrastructure is underdeveloped, agents must rely on labor-intensive technologies.
However, once the financial infrastructure improves to a certain extent, some agents
can obtain suﬃcient funds to adopt capital-intensive technology. At this point, en-
trepreneurs relying upon labor-intensive technologies are in eﬀect driven out from
the factor markets, while only those who can adopt the capital-intensive technology
begin to attract most of the surplus from the higher productivity, without distribut-
ing much to others. We derive a condition under which the rise in inequality is so
substantial, that the average utility of agents actually declines after the technological
shift.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the liter-
ature related to this topic and compares their distributional implications to those of
ours. Section 3 constructs an overlapping generations model with technology choice
under imperfect financial markets. In Section 4, we derive the equilibrium distribu-
tion of income and explain why significant inequality emerges among agents. Section
5 clarifies how financial infrastructure aﬀects the choice of technology in equilibrium.
Section 6 examines the eﬀects of improvements in financial infrastructure on the in-
come distribution and welfare in the steady state. Policies are discussed in Section
7, and Section 8 provides the conclusion. The Appendix contains the proofs for
propositions.
2 Comparison with the Literature
In the literature, there are various approaches to theoretically analyze the evolu-
tion of income distribution through the process of economic development. Among
these, close to our approach are the studies by Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Erosa
and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2005), which consider the eﬀect of improved financial infras-
tructure on income distribution. These studies have found that economic develop-
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(i) Less inequality, (ii) More inequality, (iii) More inequality,
some agents lose, no one loses, some agents lose,
welfare improves. welfare improves. welfare may worsen.
Figure 1: Patterns of changes in consumption distribution. The thick and dashed lines
indicate the distribution of consumption before and after the change, respectively. The horizontal
axis represents the index of agents. The vertical axis represents the amount of consumption by each
agent.
ment that results from improvements in the financial infrastructure will reduce the
amount of economic rent received by each incumbent rent-earner, thereby decreasing
inequality (See Figure 1(i)). Such a redistribution of income generally improves the
economy’s welfare, although it will not be supported by incumbent rent earners.2
While the above studies suggest that the income inequality reduces under a given
production technology, other studies focusing on the technological shift explain the
rise in income inequality at the early stages of economic development. Specifically,
with a fixed degree of credit market imperfection, Banerjee and Newman (1998) and
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show that when agents gradually shift to a new
technology, the degree of inequality in the economy rises temporarily due to the
disparity in income levels between the new and old sectors. In these studies, those
who moved to the new sector are better oﬀ because they voluntarily chose to move,
while those who remained in the old sector can earn an income that was as high as
what they were earning before the technological shift (See Figure 1(ii)).3 Therefore,
2See Drazen (2000) for general discussions about the conflicting interests in economic reforms.
3They actually show that the reduced labor supply in the old sector increases the wages of those
who remain in the old sector. Aghion and Bolton (1997) also show that the rise in inequality in the
early phases of development is beneficial to the poor since it enhances capital accumulation. See
Barro (2000, p. 9) for a survey of related studies.
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while a technological shift increases inequality, it weakly increases every agent’s utility
and is necessarily welfare improving.
Thus, although these two existing strands of studies found opposite implications
for inequality, both concluded that development always improves welfare. This paper
obtains a diﬀerent welfare implication when it simultaneously considers the possibil-
ity of technological shift and improvements in financial infrastructure. Naturally, we
obtain a result similar to that of Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Erosa and Hidalgo-
Cabrillana (2005) in the case where an improvement in financial infrastructure does
not cause a technological shift. However, in the case where it causes a technological
shift, it gives rise to a new economic rent and increases inequality. As shown in
Banerjee and Newman (1998) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), under a cer-
tain condition, a technological shift makes every agent better oﬀ. However, under
a diﬀerent condition, the technological shift deprives the majority of incumbent en-
trepreneurs of economic rents, and then, these rents are redistributed to a smaller
number of agents (See Figure 1(iii)). Incumbent entrepreneurs are strictly worse oﬀ,
and only a limited number of agents benefit from a technological shift. In such cases,
overcoming resistances from incumbent rent-earners does not lead to an improvement
in the economy’s welfare.
A critical diﬀerence between the results of our paper and existing theories on
technological shifts is that in our model, agents do not necessarily shift voluntarily
from the old technology to the new one. Once the improvement in the financial
infrastructure permits the adoption of a capital-intensive technology, entrepreneurs
who are equipped with that technology employ workers at a marginally higher wage.
The incumbent entrepreneurs cannot aﬀord to pay their workers at this wage level
since the profitability of the labor-intensive technology falls more sensitively with an
increase in wage level than in the case of the capital-intensive technology. Due to
this general equilibrium eﬀect, the economy cannot continue with the old technology
even when the majority of the agents are against the new technology.
While we focus on capital intensity, there are several other mechanisms through
which financial markets aﬀect technological choice. To mention a few, Saint-Paul
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(1992) shows that without a well-functioning financial market, risk-averse agents
may choose less specialized and less productive technologies. Castro et al. (2005)
demonstrate that stronger investor protection facilitates economic development, given
that the technology for producing investment goods involves a higher idiosyncratic
risk than does the technology for producing consumption goods. In contrast, Ben-
civenga et al. (1995) show that a technological shift resulting from a better financial
infrastructure may reduce the growth rate if the new technology requires a longer
duration for which investments must be committed. Each of these studies focuses
on a particular aspect of technology; however, they are not concerned with income
distribution and welfare. In our model, agents choose from among technologies with
diﬀerent capital intensities, and in this setting, we demonstrate that improvements
in financial infrastructure do not necessarily improve the economy’s welfare.
3 The Model
3.1 Economic Environments
Consider an overlapping generations economy, where each generation contains a unit
mass of agents who live for two periods (young and old). The life of an agent who
was born in period t proceeds as follows. In the first period, he supplies one unit of
labor inelastically to the competitive labor market and receives the market wage wt,
measured in terms of consumption goods. For the purpose of simplicity, we assume
that the agent’s utility depends only on the amount of consumption in the second
period, ct+1. In order to finance this consumption, the agent makes use of his first-
period income wt in one of two ways. First, he may save it entirely and consume
ct+1 = rwt in the second period. Interest rate r ≥ 1 is constant either because the
economy under consideration is a small open economy or because there is a storage
technology that yields the gross rate of return r.4
4Recent empirical studies suggest that financial markets promote economic development not by
enhancing overall capital accumulation but by eﬃciently allocating capital across sectors (e.g., Wur-
gler 2000). The open economy assumption enables us to focus on the role of financial markets in
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His second option is to become an entrepreneur and start a project. At most
each agent can undertake one project, and a project cannot be shared by multiple
entrepreneurs due to information and enforcement problems among them. When
starting a project, an agent chooses from among a discrete set of technologies, J .
Every technology produces a homogeneous consumption good from capital and labor
with constant returns to scale. Specifically, if the agent adopts technology j ∈ J , his
project produces the consumption good according to
yt+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
kt+1fj(`t+1/kt+1), if kt+1 ≥ Ij,
0 if kt+1 < Ij,
(1)
where `t+1 and kt+1 are the amounts of labor and capital inputs, respectively, and
fj(·) is the per unit capital (not per capita) production function of technology j.
Equation (1) shows that exploiting the potential of each technology requires at least
a certain amount of investment. The minimal required amount of capital, denoted by
Ij ≥ 0, diﬀers across technologies, and depends on technical aspects (e.g., the scope
of scale economy for that technology) and various barriers to the adoption of the
technologies, which may be specific to each economy. Capital depreciates completely
within one period and fj(·) satisfies the standard Inada conditions for all j ∈ J .
As is standard in overlapping generation models, we assume that the output (con-
sumption goods) in period t can be used as the capital in period t+ 1. However, the
agent’s first-period income, wt, often falls short of the minimum required amount of
capital, Ij. In that case, he must finance the gap by borrowing from the competitive
financial intermediaries, which we call banks. Banks can borrow from the interna-
tional credit market at the constant world interest rate r, whereas agents cannot
do so because of the issue of limited enforcement, as explained below. In order to
obtain the loan, kt+1 − wt, which is needed to finance the investment of size kt+1,
the agent applies to banks by announcing the plan of his project, comprising three
determining the demand for capital and its composition rather than the supply of capital, which is
given by the amount of savings in the closed economy setting. The assumption of storage technology
is more suitable for low income countries, where inventories are the principal substitutes for invest-
ment (see discussions by Bencivenga and Smith 1993, Section 5). In the latter case, we implicitly
assume that the demand for capital never exceeds the amount of aggregate savings.
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elements–the choice of technology, j ∈ J , the size of investment, kt+1 ≥ Ij, and
the amount of his own fund, wt–which are verifiable, and thus, contractable. If the
agent is approached by several banks, he chooses a loan contract from the bank that
oﬀers the lowest gross interest rate, denoted by Rt. If the agent is denied the loan at
any interest rate–i.e., if he is credit rationed–he gives up becoming an entrepreneur
and lends his entire first-period income to the credit market.
At period t+1, an entrepreneur (an agent who has successfully obtained credit or
has managed his investment fully using his own funds) decides the number of young
workers to hire, `t+1 > 0, at the market wage rate wt+1. The revenue from the project
is yt+1 − wt+1`t+1. The entrepreneur is obliged to repay the loan from this revenue;
however, he has an option to default at a certain cost. We assume that the cost of
default is proportional to the revenue from the project, λ(yt+1 − wt+1`t+1), where
λ ∈ (0, 1). If he defaults, his consumption becomes ct+1 = (1 − λ)(yt+1 − wt+1`t+1);
otherwise, he repays the loan and consumes ct+1 = yt+1 −wt+1`t+1 −Rt+1(kt+1 −wt)
units of the good.
This setting is equivalent to assuming that lenders can capture only 100λ percent
of the cash flow from any project. Thus, parameter λ represents the quality of
the economy’s financial infrastructure, such as legal and accounting systems, which
determines the enforceability of financial contracts.
3.2 Behaviors of Households and Banks
This subsection examines the rational behaviors of generation-t households (who
become entrepreneurs at period t + 1 if they obtain credit) and banks, taking as
given their first-period income wt and the market wage rate at their second period
wt+1. The decision processes are sequential, and therefore, can be solved backward.
The final decision is to determine the number of workers to hire `t+1, given that the
entrepreneur has already chosen technology j and the amount of capital kt+1 ≥ Ij.
Whether or not the entrepreneur decides to default, her objective at this stage is
to maximize revenue yt+1 − wt+1`t+1 with respect to labor input `t+1, where output
yt+1 is given by (1). A straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that it is optimal to
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choose
`t+1 = f
0
j
−1
(wt+1)kt+1 ≡ e`j(wt+1)kt+1, (2)
where e`j(wt+1) ≡ f 0j−1(wt) represents the optimal labor input per unit capital as a
decreasing function of market wage wt+1. The rate of return from this project (the
amount of maximized revenue divided by the amount of capital) is
ρj(wt+1) = fj(e`j(wt+1))− wt+1e`j(wt+1), (3)
which is decreasing in market wage wt+1. Out of revenue ρj(wt+1)kt+1, the en-
trepreneur repays the loan unless it exceeds the cost of default. That is, the loan will
be repaid if and only if
Rt+1(kt+1 − wt) ≤ λρj(wt+1)kt+1. (4)
Banks oﬀer loans to potential entrepreneurs if and only if the entrepreneurs are
willing to repay them and banks can earn an interest at least as large as the market
interest rate r. As long as repayment from entrepreneurs is expected, competition
among banks brings the interest rate down to r. Banks are assured of the repayment
if a prospective entrepreneur’s planned project, summarized by (j, kt+1, wt), satisfies
condition (4) at interest rate Rt+1 = r. Using the size of investment for the proposed
project, this condition can be written as:
kt+1 ≤
wt
1− λρj(wt+1)/r
if λρj(wt+1) < r. (5)
If the proposed plan fails to satisfy (5), the project cannot obtain credit at any interest
rate.5 It can be observed from (3) and (5) that the equilibrium wage in period t+ 1,
wt+1, must satisfy λρj(wt+1) < r for any technology j ∈ J . If it is not satisfied
(i.e., when the rate of return from the investment satisfies ρj(wt+1) ≥ r/λ > r),
entrepreneurs can obtain an infinite payoﬀ by investing an infinite amount of capital
and hiring an unbounded number of workers, which clearly results in excess demand
5Note that a higher interest rate makes condition (4) stricter and gives borrowers more incentive
to default. Thus, banks cannot make a profit (even zero profit) by oﬀering a loan for projects that
do not satisfy (5) with an interest rate higher than r.
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in the labor market. Thus, the equilibrium wage wt+1 must satisfy
wt+1 > max
j∈J
ρ−1j (r/λ) ≡ w(λ). (6)
Now let us return to the choice of technology and the size of investment. A
prospective entrepreneur chooses j and kt+1 in order to maximize her second-period
consumption,
ct+1 = rwt + (ρj(wt+1)− r) kt+1. (7)
This expression shows that she wants to become an entrepreneur (i.e., she wants to
choose some j and set kt+1 > 0 rather than save all her first-period income and choose
kt+1 = 0) only when the rate of return from the investment ρj(wt+1) is at least as
high as the interest rate. Since the rate of return depends on the market wage wt+1,
this condition can be written as
wt+1 ≤ ρ−1j (r) ≡ Pj, (8)
which we call the profitability constraint. The constant Pj represents the level of
market wage at which a project with technology j breaks even. We assume that Pj
is smaller than the size of minimum investment Ij.
6
When the profitability constraint is satisfied, the agent is willing (at least weakly)
to start a project. In particular, when the profitability constraint holds with strict
inequality, she wants to invest as much as possible. Under (6), however, condition
(5) implies that there is an upper bound for the size of investment and this upper
bound depends on the amount of the entrepreneur’s own fund, wt. In addition, to
adopt technology j, at least Ij units of capital must be invested. This implies that
the entrepreneur must provide suﬃcient own funds such that the upper bound is at
least as large as Ij. Comparing the right hand side (RHS) of (5) with Ij, we obtain
wt ≥
µ
1− λρj(wt+1)
r
¶
Ij ≡ ηj(wt+1,λ), (9)
6If entrepreneurs have ample own funds, they will be able adopt the most profitable technology
without relying on the financial market. However, historical instances wherein financial markets
aﬀected economic performance imply that entrepreneurs usually have insuﬃcient funds to self-
finance their projects. Accordingly, we assume Ij > Pj , where Pj is the upper bound of the
first-period income when the economy specializes in a technology j.
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where function ηj(·) represents the minimum amount of own funds required to borrow
from banks to start a project with technology j. Since this minimum requirement
is increasing in the market wage wt+1, condition (9) can be stated in terms of the
market wage wt+1, given the amount of own fund wt:
wt+1 ≤ ρ−1j [(r/λ) (1− wt/Ij)] ≡ Bj(wt,λ). (10)
We call (10), or, equivalently, (9), the borrowing constraint for technology j. Agents
can adopt technology j unless the market wage exceeds Bj(wt,λ). This borrowing
constraint relaxes (i.e., Bj(wt,λ) increases) when the agent has more own funds wt
or the economy’s financial infrastructure λ improves.
Now we are ready to describe the occupational choice of agents in terms of the
market wage wt+1 and the amount of own funds wt. Combining (8) and (10), we
see that technology j satisfies both the profitability and borrowing constraints if and
only if
wt+1 ≤ min{Pj, Bj(wt,λ)} ≡ φj(wt,λ). (11)
If market wage wt+1 is below or equal to φj(wt,λ), an agent with own fund wt is both
able and willing to become an entrepreneur with technology j, rather than merely
save her first-period income. Among the potentially usable technologies J , there
exists at least one of such technology if7
wt+1 ≤ max
j∈J
φj(wt,λ) ≡ θ(wt,λ). (12)
In this case, the agent becomes an entrepreneur, invests as much as she can borrow
(see condition 5):
kt+1 =
wt
1− λρj(wt+1)/r
=
wt
ηj(wt+1,λ)
Ij. (13)
7When condition (12) is satisfied, (11) implies that there must be some technology j such that
wt+1 < θ(wt,λ) = min{Pj , Bj(wt,λ)}. It follows that wt+1 < Bj(wt,λ) and wt+1 < Pj ; that is,
technology j satisfies the credit constraints, and its rate of return is strictly larger than r. If there
are more than two such technologies, the entrepreneur chooses the most profitable technology. In
equilibrium, as we will consider in the next section, there is generically only one technology that
satisfies this condition.
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Note that wt/ηj(wt+1,λ) in equation (13) represents the ratio of actual own funds to
the amount required to obtain the credit and is therefore always above 1. From (2),
(3), and (7), the consumption of the entrepreneur and the individual labor demand
from this project are
`t+1 = kt+1e`j(wt+1) = wtηj(wt+1,λ)Ij e`j(wt+1), (14)
ct+1 = rwt + (ρj(wt+1)− r)
wt
ηj(wt+1,λ)
Ij. (15)
The second term in (15) represents the surplus income obtained by virtue of becoming
an entrepreneur.
If the market wage wt+1 is above the threshold θ(wt,λ), the rate of return from
any technology that satisfies the credit constraint falls short of r. Then, it is best
for the agent to save her entire first-period income (i.e., kt+1 = `t+1 = 0) and receive
ct+1 = rwt. Finally, if wt+1 = θ(wt,λ), then either the profitability or profitability
constraint is exactly binding. If the profitability constraint is not binding (then the
borrowing constraint must be binding), the agent strictly prefers to start a project,
similar to the case of wt+1 < θ(wt,λ). Otherwise, she is indiﬀerent as to whether or
not to start a project: investment kt+1 can be zero or anywhere between the minimum
amount Ij and the RHS of (13); the labor demand is `t+1 = kt+1e`j(wt+1), and any
choice results in ct+1 = rwt.
4 Inequality in Equilibrium
This section establishes the existence of an equilibrium wage rate at which the aggre-
gate supply of and demand for labor are equalized, and then it examines the extent
of inequality that arises in equilibrium. Before proceeding to the formal analysis,
we first present an intuitive explanation of how and when a significant income in-
equality arises among old agents in equilibrium. For this purpose, it is convenient to
temporarily introduce a small ex ante heterogeneity among agents. In particular, for
the time being, we assume that each agent, while in his/her youth, experiences an
exogenous income shock, ²t, which is chosen randomly from a uniform distribution
between 0 and ² > 0.
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Suppose that the agents in each generation are now indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and that
agent i’s realized first-period income is given by wt + ²it. In the previous section, we
showed that an agent with own fund wt is willing to become an entrepreneur if the
market wage wt+1 is below the threshold level of θ(wt,λ). Since we now assume that
agents have heterogeneous amounts of own funds, wt+ ²it, the threshold θ(wt+ ²it,λ)
may also vary across agents. From its definition, function θ(wt + ²it,λ) is increasing
in wt + ²it, θ(0,λ) = w(λ) > 0, and limwt+²it→∞ θ(wt + ²it,λ) = maxj∈J Pj < ∞.
Therefore, the threshold level for any agent is within a (small) finite interval [θt, θt],
where
θt ≡ θ(wt,λ), θt ≡ θ(wt + ²,λ).
From this observation, it follows that the equilibrium level of market wage, wt+1,
must be somewhere between θt and θt. If wt+1 > θt, then no agent starts a project,
and therefore the aggregate labor demand would be zero. Conversely, if wt+1 < θt,
then all old agents strictly prefer to start projects, which (under Assumption 1 below)
necessarily results in excess demand for labor. Therefore, if there exists an equilibrium
wage level wt+1 such that the aggregate labor demand coincides with the aggregate
labor supply, it must be within interval [θt, θt].
Figure 2 depicts a typical shape of function θ(·) against the amount of own funds,
wt + ²it, which we call the θ curve. The shape of the θ curve on a short interval
[wt, wt + ²] determines θt and θt. One possibility is that the curve is entirely flat in
that interval. In this case, θt and θt are the same, and the equilibrium wage is uniquely
determined at this level. Note that a flat segment of the θ curve corresponds to the
profitability constraint for some technology j. In equilibrium, wt+1 = θt = θt = Pj
holds, which means from (8) that the rate of return from investment ρj(wt+1) is the
same as the interest rate r. Therefore, all agents are indiﬀerent regarding their choice
to become entrepreneurs or save their income. Irrespective of what they decide, they
obtain ct+1 = r(wt+²it). Given that the magnitude of random income ²it is marginal,
the inequality of consumption in the second period is also marginal.
However, we have a diﬀerent distributional consequence when the θ curve is up-
ward sloping in interval [wt, wt+ ²]. Since an upward sloping segment corresponds to
13
Figure 2: An Example of the θ curve. It depicts a case of two technologies, J =
{A,M}. The gray area represents the distribution of the agents’ own funds when
they face small income shocks.
a borrowing constraint for a particular technology, the profitability constraint is not
(generically) binding in this case. This implies that the rate of return from starting
a project is strictly higher than r, and that every agent strictly prefers to start a
project. However, if this were the case, the overall labor demand would exceed the
aggregate supply. Thus, the equilibrium wage wt+1 must be between θt and θt so
that some agents (whose θ(wt + ²it,λ) is below wt+1) do not satisfy the borrowing
constraint. In other words, some agents must be rationed from the credit market.
The consumption of these credit-rationed agents is significantly lower than that of
the entrepreneurs, generating a non-trivial inequality among old agents.
In the remainder of this section, we formally establish the existence of the market
equilibrium and explicitly derive the equilibrium income distribution. In this econ-
omy, the aggregate supply of labor is given by the population of the young agents,
which has been normalized to 1. Given this period’s market wage wt+1 and the la-
bor income in the previous period, wt, the aggregate labor demand is obtained by
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summing the decisions of all the old agents,
LDt+1(wt+1;wt) ≡
∙Z
θ(wt+²it)>wt+1
`i t+1 di,
Z
θ(wt+²it)≥wt+1
`i t+1 di
¸
, (16)
where `i t+1 is given by (14), with wt being replaced by wt + ²it. As shown in (16),
function LDt+1(wt+1;wt) is a set-valued function (or correspondence) because agents
may be indiﬀerent with regard to whether or not to start a project (and hire a worker).
We assume that, if all old agents start projects, the aggregate labor demand will
exceeds the aggregate labor supply. More specifically,
Assumption 1 Ij > 1/e`j(Pj) for all j ∈ J .
From (14), Assumption 1 means that each project requires hiring more than one
worker, which we reasonably assume to be satisfied throughout the paper. Now, we
can put forward the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that the number of intersec-
tions between functions ρj(wt+1) and ρj0(wt+1) for any j 6= j0 is not infinite. Then,
given the previous period’s equilibrium wage wt > 0, there is an equilibrium level of
wt+1 ∈ [θt, θt], with which 1 ∈ LDt+1(wt+1;wt) holds.
Proof: In Appendix
Although the proof is technical (mainly because aggregate labor demand is given by
a set-valued function), the intuition is clear. Aggregate labor demand is above one
for wt+1 < θt, and is zero for wt+1 > θt. Moreover, in the Appendix, we show that
aggregate labor demand is continuous with respect to wt+1.
8 Thus, it follows that
there must be a level of wt+1 between θt and θt, at which the aggregate labor demand
coincides with its supply.
It is noteworthy that the result of Proposition 1 does not depend on the size of
the heterogeneity term in the income of young agents. In particular, even in the case
of the limit in which the heterogeneity is almost negligible (more specifically, when
8Since LDt+1(·) is set-valued, the notion of continuity is slightly diﬀerent from that for a function.
Precisely, in the Appendix, we show that LDt+1(·) is convex-valued, non-empty, and upper hemi
continuous, which implies that the graph of labor demand in (LDt+1, wt+1) space is jointed.
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the distribution of ²it ∈ [0, ²] is almost degenerate; i.e., ² → 0), Proposition 1 still
shows that there exists an equilibrium level of market wage, wt+1. In that case, we
can state the properties of the equilibrium more explicitly.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the assumptions in Proposition 1 hold and the ex ante
heterogeneity is negligible (²→ 0); then, the equilibrium at the limit is characterized
as follows:
a. Equilibrium wage wt+1 is determined by θ(wt,λ).
b. The choice of technology in equilibrium, denoted by j∗, is such that φj∗(wt,λ) is
the highest from among all the technologies.
c. Credit rationing occurs if and only if the amount of own funds wt satisfies
wt < (1− λ)Ij∗. (17)
d. When credit rationing occurs, the number of entrepreneurs nt+1 and their con-
sumption cet+1 are given by
nt+1 =
³
Ij∗ e`j∗(Bj∗(wt,λ))´−1 < 1, (18)
cet+1 = rwt + r((1− λ)Ij∗ − wt)/λ, (19)
while the consumption of the other agents is rwt < c
e
t+1. When there is no credit
rationing, the consumption of all the agents is rwt.
Proof: In Appendix.
In the remainder of the paper, we continue to consider the limiting case of ² → 0
and omit the ²it term in the analysis. Proposition 2 implies that only the technology
that can oﬀer the highest wage within its profitability and borrowing constraints can
operate in equilibrium. Entrepreneurs with other technologies cannot operate because
they cannot hire workers at the market wage level. The proposition also shows that,
even at the limit where almost no ex ante heterogeneity exists, a significant inequality
arises between those who obtain credit and those who do not. More specifically, in
a credit constrained equilibrium, each of nt+1 (< 1) entrepreneurs obtains economic
rents of r((1 − λ)Ij∗ − wt) over the income of others, rwt. Using this result, the
following two sections consider the eﬀects of improvements in financial infrastructure
on the equilibrium distribution of income and the welfare of agents.
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5 Technological Shift
Proposition 2 implies that other things being equal, a better financial infrastructure
results in a more equal income distribution through the easing of credit rationing.
From (18) and (19), a stronger enforcement of financial contract (a larger λ) increases
the number of entrepreneurs, nt+1, and reduces the size of economic rent, r((1−λ)Ij∗−
wt), received by each of them. In addition, (17) shows that credit rationing disappears
when λ is above the threshold level of 1−wt/Ij∗. However, these observations do not
allow us to conclude that there is a monotonic relationship between the quality of
financial infrastructure and the extent of inequality, because the threshold level for
credit rationing, 1−wt/Ij∗, as well as nt+1 and cet+1, depends on the equilibrium choice
of technology j∗, which in turn depends on the financial infrastructure λ. Thus, we
need to clarify when an increase in λ causes a technological shift.
This section examines the role of financial infrastructure in determining the equi-
librium choice of technology. For concreteness, suppose that the set of usable tech-
nologies are composed of Cobb-Douglas technologies, and their per unit capital pro-
duction functions are given by
fj(`/k) = Aj(`/k)
1−αj , k ≥ Ij, (20)
where productivity Aj, capital intensity αj, and the minimum size of investment Ij
are diﬀerent among technologies. Substituting (20) into (3) and then into (8) and
(10), the profitability and borrowing constraints now become the following:
wt+1 ≤ (1− αj) (αj/r)bαj Abαj+1j ≡ Pj, (21)
wt+1 ≤ Pj (λIj/(Ij − wt))bαj ≡ Bj(wt,λ), (22)
where bαj ≡ αj/(1− αj) > 0. The value of φj(wt,λ) is given by the smaller of Pj and
Bj(wt,λ). As stated in Proposition 2, the equilibrium choice of technology is such
that φj(wt,λ) is the highest from among all the technologies.
While our concern is when a marginal increase in λ causes a technological shift,
it is insightful to see how the pattern of technological specialization is aﬀected by
large changes in λ. In particular, when the economy’s financial infrastructure is quite
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primitive (λ→ 0), then the borrowing constraint becomes very tight (Bj(wt,λ)→ 0
for every j), which means that φj(wt,λ) is determined by Bj(wt,λ). In addition, (22)
indicates that the higher the capital intensity, the more rapidly Bj(wt,λ) converges
to 0 as λ → 0. This implies that, with a suﬃciently low λ, the economy specializes
in a labor-intensive technology. Intuitively, if the enforcement of financial contracts
is weak, only a small number of agents obtain funds due to tight credit rationing. In
such a situation, entrepreneurs who have successfully obtained funds can hire a large
number of workers at a low wage level, in which case, the labor-intensive technology
is more suitable. Conversely, when the enforcement of financial contracts is nearly
perfect (λ→ 1), the borrowing constraint becomes weaker than the profitability con-
straint (Bj(wt,λ) > Pj for every j), which implies that φj(wt,λ) is determined by Pj.
Hence, the economy specializes in the technology with the highest profitability Pj,
which is largely determined by the technology’s productivity Aj. Thus, when devel-
opment in financial infrastructure triggers a technological shift, the new technology
tends to have higher capital intensity and higher profitability. If the profitability of a
capital-intensive technology is low, it will never be adopted at any stage of economic
development. If the capital intensity of a highly profitable technology is low, it would
be adopted from the beginning and therefore there would be no technological shift.
Let us derive the precise condition under which a technological shift occurs. By
denoting the technology before the shift A and that after the shift M , the above ob-
servation implies that the new technology has a higher capital intensity αM > αA and
a higher profitability PM > PA. In this setting, the technological shift occurs when
φA(wt,λ) ≡ min{PA, BA(wt,λ)} is overtaken by φM(wt,λ) ≡ min{PM , BM(wt,λ)}.
Since PM > PA ≥ φA(wt,λ), the value of φM(wt,λ) is larger than that of φA(wt,λ)
when either BM(wt,λ) ≥ PA or BM(wt,λ) ≥ BA(wt,λ) holds.9 Intuitively, as long as
technology A is used, the equilibrium market wage wt+1 is bounded above by both
the profitability constraint PA and the borrowing constraint BA(wt,λ) for technology
9To verify this, observe that φM ≥ φA ⇔ min{PM , BM} ≥ φA ⇔ PM ≥ φA and BM ≥ φA.
In the last condition, PM ≥ φA always holds because PM > PA ≥ min{PA, BA} ≡ φA. Therefore
φM ≥ φA ⇔ BM ≥ φA ⇔ BM ≥ min{PA, BA}⇔ BM ≥ PA or BM ≥ BA.
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A. If the borrowing constraint for technology M is weaker than (i.e., BM(wt,λ) is
higher than) either of those two constraints, it means that agents can borrow enough
fund to adopt technology M . In fact, agents always shift to technology M if this
condition holds, since technology M is more profitable than technology A.
From (22), solving BM(wt,λ) ≥ PA gives
λ ≥
µ
PA
PM
¶1/bαMµ
1− wt
IM
¶
≡ Λ1(wt). (23)
Similarly BM(wt,λ) ≥ BA(wt,λ) holds if and only if w < IA and
λ ≥
"
PA
PM
µ
1− wt
IM
¶bαMµ
1− wt
IA
¶−bαA#1/(bαM−bαA)
≡ Λ2(wt). (24)
For convenience, let us define Λ2(wt) = ∞ when wt ≥ IA. Combining these two
conditions shows that the economy shifts to technology M whenever
φM(wt,λ) ≥ φA(wt,λ)⇔
λ ≥ min{Λ1(wt),Λ2(wt)} ≡ Λ(wt).
(25)
This clearly shows that the economy shifts from a labor-intensive technology to a
more capital-intensive technology when the financial infrastructure improves to a
certain extent. A typical shape of function Λ(wt) has been calculated numerically in
Figure 3.
Figure 3 also depicts the regions in which credit rationing occurs. (From condi-
tion 17, credit rationing occurs whenever λ < 1− wt/Ij∗). We observe that a simple
relationship does not exist between the degree of contract enforcement and the ex-
istence of credit rationing. Specifically, economies in region BM experience credit
rationing even though they have a better financial infrastructure than economies in
region PA, where no such rationing occurs. Similarly, credit rationing in region BM
can be more fierce than in BA, particularly when technologyM requires a larger scale
of production. In other words, better financial infrastructure enables the economy
to adopt more productive technologies, but at the same time, may cause greater in-
equality. While it may appear strange, this is not particularly at odds with reality.
Credit rationing is not necessarily most prevalent at the initial stage of economic
development, when the financial infrastructure is weak. Our model shows that such
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Figure 3: Technology choice and credit regime. Numerically calculated using parameter
values of αA = .20, αM = .45, r = 2.0, PA = 1.20, PM = 2.25, IA = 1.8, and IM = 3.5. Region PA
disappears when IA > IM .
non-monotonic behavior arises because the degree of enforcement λ not only aﬀects
the diﬃculty of obtaining credit for a given technology but is also a determinant of
the economy’s technology specialization.
6 Dynamic Eﬀects of Improved Financial Infras-
tructure
Now, we will investigate the dynamic eﬀects of financial infrastructure. Li, Squire,
and Zou (1998) showed that the degree of credit market imperfections can diﬀer
markedly across countries but change only slowly within countries. La Porta et
al. (1998) found the dependence of the current performance of the financial market
on an economy’s colonial and legal origins. Both these observations suggest that
improvements in financial infrastructure λ, if any, must be gradual. This section
examines how such gradual improvements aﬀect the economy’s income distribution
and welfare.
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6.1 Wage Dynamics over Generations
Until this section, we have assumed as given the value of wt, the amount of own
funds held by each entrepreneur. However, since an entrepreneur’s own funds are her
first-period income, it is in fact endogenously determined by the equilibrium level
of wage in one period before. In other words, the equilibrium wage in this period
determines the amount of own funds for the next generation, which in turn aﬀects the
the equilibrium wage in the next period. In this way, the equilibrium wage evolves
dynamically over generations.
Recall from Proposition 2 that wt evolves over generations according to wt+1 =
θ(wt,λ). When credit rationing is absent, i.e., when the (λ, wt) pair is in region PA
or PM of Figure 3, the equilibrium wage is determined by the profitability constraint:
wt+1 = PA or PM . When credit rationing occurs, i.e., when the (λ, wt) pair is in
region BA or BM , the equilibrium wage is determined by the borrowing constraint:
wt+1 = BA(wt,λ) or BM(wt,λ). In the latter case, equation (22) implies that equilib-
rium wage wt+1 is higher (or lower) than the previous period’s wage wt, if financial
infrastructure λ is better (or worse) than
B∗j (wt) ≡ (1− wt/Ij)(wt/Pj)1/bαj . (26)
Function B∗j (wt) gives the quality of financial infrastructure such that the market
wage becomes stationary at wt under technology j.
Figure 4 depicts the steady state level of wt against λ and also indicates the
direction of its movement when wt is oﬀ the steady state. A number of properties
can be observed from this. First, for a given level of λ, there is at least one steady
state. There can be multiple steady states, but the lowest steady state (i.e., the
steady state with the lowest wt) is always stable. This means that, as long as the
amount of own funds held by the initial old agents, w0, is suﬃciently small, the
economy converges to the lowest steady state, which we denote by w∗(λ). We assume
that this is the case and suppose that the economy always stays near the lowest
steady state w∗(λ) in the long run.
Second, the steady state income of young agents w∗(λ) grows with the financial
infrastructure. This implies that the income of credit-rationed agents, rw∗(λ), in-
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(i) IA ≤ ζ(IM) (ii) IA > ζ(IM)
Figure 4: The steady state level of wage for diﬀerent sizes of minimum investments.
Numerically calculated using the same parameter values as in Figure 3. Minimum sizes of invest-
ments are IA = 1.8, IM = 3 (panel i); IA = 1.5, IM = 4 (panel ii).
creases when the financial infrastructure improves. Third, there is a threshold level
of financial infrastructure, denoted by λsft, such that a technology shift occurs. More
specifically, in the steady state, the economy specializes in technology j∗(λ) = A if
λ < λsft and j∗(λ) =M if λ ≥ λsft. In particular, observe that the steady state wage
w∗(λ) is continuous with respect to λ even at λsft. This means that a technological
shift only marginally aﬀects the income of credit-rationed agents, rw∗(λ). In other
words, if a technological shift changes the income distribution drastically, it occurs
only through the changes in the way in which economic rents are distributed.
Finally, the precise pattern of the evolution depends on the minimum size of
investment. The locus of the steady state transits region PA, as shown by panel (i),
only if IA is smaller than a threshold of
ζ(IM) ≡ PA
¡
1− (PA/PM)1/bαM (1− PA/IM)¢−1 . (27)
In this case, there are no rent earners immediately before the technological shift.
However, if the minimum size of the old technology is larger than ζ(IM), credit
rationing exists immediately before the technological shift, as shown by panel (ii).
This means that there exist a group of agents who lose economic rents when the
technological shift occurs.
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In Appendix, Lemma 1 formally establishes the above four properties under rea-
sonably weak conditions.
6.2 Income Distribution in the Steady State
With the economy’s technological specialization j∗(λ) and the amount of own funds
w∗(λ) in hand, we can characterize the income distribution of agents in the steady
state as a function of the economy’s financial infrastructure, λ. More specifically,
we consider the distribution of consumption among old agents (which coincides with
their gross income) since in this economy, only old agents are assumed to obtain
utility from consumption.
When w∗(λ) ≥ (1 − λ)Ij∗(λ), there is no credit rationing. In this case, the con-
sumption of all the old agents is rw∗(λ). When w∗(λ) < (1−λ)Ij∗(λ), credit rationing
occurs, and only a limited number of agents can start projects. By substituting (2),
(20), and (22) into (18), we obtain the number of entrepreneurs in a credit rationing
steady state as
n∗(λ) ≡ bαjPj
rIj
µ
λIj
Ij − w∗(λ)
¶1+bαj
, where j = j∗(λ). (28)
Among the old agents, n∗(λ) of them start projects, and from (19), their earnings
are
ce∗(λ) ≡ 1− λ
λ
r (Ij − w∗(λ)) . (29)
The remaining 1 − n∗(λ) agents are rationed from the credit market and end up
consuming rw∗(λ) in the steady state.
Before formally characterizing the eﬀect of financial infrastructure on the income
distribution and welfare, it is illustrative to consider its eﬀects on the economy’s
aggregates, such as aggregate consumption (which coincides with the gross national
production in our model) and the Gini coeﬃcient. Recall that only the old agents
consume and their population is 1. When there is no credit rationing, the aggregate
consumption C∗(λ) is the same as every agent’s consumption rw∗(λ). Since there
is no inequality, the Gini coeﬃcient G∗(λ) is obviously zero. With credit rationing,
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(i) IA ≤ ζ(IM) (ii) IA > ζ(IM)
Figure 5: Aggregate consumption and the Gini coeﬃcient at the lowest steady state.
Parameters: IA = 1.5, IM = 10 (panel i); IA = 8.5, IM = 10 (panel ii).
aggregate consumption and the Gini coeﬃcient are, from (28) and (29),
C∗(λ) = rw∗(λ) + n∗(λ)(r/λ)
¡
(1− λ)Ij∗(λ) − w∗(λ)
¢
, (30)
G∗(λ) = (1− n∗(λ)) (1− rw∗(λ)/C∗(λ)) . (31)
When the financial infrastructure improves (λ increases), the aggregate consump-
tion and the Gini coeﬃcient respond in the following way.
Proposition 3 a. C∗(λ) is weakly increasing in λ for all λ;
b. G∗(λ) is weakly decreasing in λ for all λ except at λ = λsft.
Proof: In Appendix.
Property a shows that improvements in financial infrastructure facilitate economic
development in the sense that it increases the aggregate consumption. In particular,
function C∗(λ) is strictly upward sloping when the economy faces credit rationing,
and it rises discretely when a technological shift occurs. Flat segments of function
C∗(λ) correspond to the region of λ under which no credit rationing occurs. In that
case, a marginal change in λ has no eﬀect.
In addition, property b shows that a better financial infrastructure reduces in-
equality as long as the same technology is used. However, we cannot determine its
eﬀect on inequality when a technological shift occurs. In fact, as depicted in Figure
5, the Gini coeﬃcient tends to increase when a technological shift occurs. (Observe
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that G∗(λ) rises discontinuously at λ = λsft.) This confirms our earlier observation
that the degree of inequality changes non-monotonically when an economy develops
though improvements in the financial infrastructure.
6.3 Distribution of Economic Rents and Welfare Eﬀects
In the remainder of this section, we consider the welfare eﬀects of the changes in
income distribution. Specifically, we examine the eﬀect of improved financial infras-
tructure on the average (or, equivalently, sum) of utility among all the old agents in
the steady state:10
U∗(λ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
n∗(λ)u(ce∗(λ)) + (1− n∗(λ))u(rw∗(λ)) with credit rationing
u(rw∗(λ)) without credit rationing,
where individual utility function satisfies u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. As we have observed
above, a marginal improvement in financial infrastructure has diﬀerent eﬀects on the
economy depending on whether it causes a technological shift or not. Let us consider
possible cases in turn.
Case 1: When an increase in λ does not cause a technological shift.
As long as the same technology is used, an increase in λ has eﬀects on income
distribution only when credit rationing occurs, i.e., when the economy is either in
region BA or in PA. In that case, the equilibrium wage w
∗(λ) rises (see Figure 4),
which means that the consumption of credit-rationed agents, rw∗(λ), also rises. In
addition, from equations (28) and (29), we observe that the number of rent earners,
n∗(λ), increases and the income of each of them, ce∗(λ), falls. Intuitively, an improved
10We use this specification of U∗(λ) for two other reasons besides simplicity. First, among various
welfare criteria, the Benthamian welfare function is considered as paying relatively little attention to
inequality. We will show that the rise in inequality at the point of technological shift can be welfare
reducing even under such a welfare function. Second, U∗(λ) can be interpreted as the expected
utility of young agents when they are uncertain about whether they can obtain funds or be credit
rationed in the future. Given that the reforms in the financial infrastructure take considerable time,
it is reasonable to evaluate the desirability of a change in λ based on its eﬀect on the current young
generation’s expected utility.
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financial infrastructure enables more agents to obtain funds and thereby increases the
aggregate supply of capital. Increased supply of capital, in turn, raises the equilibrium
wage and therefore the income of credit-rationed agents. However, a rise in the
equilibrium wage erodes the rate of return from the project, and as a result, the
income of each entrepreneur falls.
As illustrated in Figure 1(i), these changes imply that some of the economic rents
received by initial entrepreneurs are redistributed to credit-rationed agents, some of
whom have now become entrepreneurs and receive rents, while the others also benefit
from the increased labor income. Moreover, the aggregate consumption, or the total
pie, also increases. As a result, U∗(λ) unambiguously improves.
Case 2: When a technological shift occurs in an economy without credit rationing.
Consider the case in which there is an absence of credit rationing in the economy
when λ is slightly below λsft. Such a case occurs when the size of minimum investment
for technology A satisfies IA ≤ ζ(IM) (see Figure 4(i)). Before the technological shift,
the economy is in region PA and all the old agents earn rw
∗(λ) = rPA. When λ is
raised slightly above λ, the economy moves to region BM , where credit rationing
occurs. This creates substantial income inequality, but, nonetheless, all the agents
are better oﬀ. To verify this, recall that the equilibrium wage w∗(λ) does not fall
by a technological switch. In fact, we have seen that w∗(λ) is weakly increasing and
continuous at λ = λsft. Thus, the income of credit-rationed agents, rw∗(λ) is at
least as high as the income before the shift (see Figure 1(ii)). In addition, in region
BM , entrepreneurs earn surplus rents over rw
∗(λ), and therefore, their income is now
discretely higher than before. Intuitively, the high productivity of the new technology
allows them to earn economic rents without exploiting workers. As a result, welfare
U∗(λ) unambiguously improves.
Case 3: When a technological shift occurs in a credit-rationed economy.
Finally, let us consider the case in which IA > ζ(IM), for which a comparison
must be made between income distribution in region BA and that in region BM (see
Figure 4(ii)). In this case, technological shift may not make every agent better oﬀ,
since some entrepreneurs adopting technology A may lose their economic rents when
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Figure 6: Welfare consequence of the technological shift. The number of rent earners
discretely declines at the point of the technological shift if the (IA, IM ) pair is within the dark-gray
area between the two thick curves. The curves are calculated numerically under parameter values
of αA = .20, αM = .45, r = 2.0, PA = 1.20, and PM = 2.25.
the economy shifts to technology M . Nonetheless, the technological shift would
be welfare improving if it distributes economic rents more widely among agents.
However, the following proposition shows that this is not necessarily the case.
Proposition 4 When a slight increase in λ causes a technological shift, the number
of old agents who earn more than rwt in the lowest steady state decreases if and only
if IA ∈ (ζ(IM),χ(IM)) and IM ≥ IM , where χ(IM) is a continuous function satisfying
ζ(IM) < χ(IM) < IM and IM ≡ PA (bαM/bαA − 1) / ¡(PM/PA)1/bαM − 1¢ .
Proof: In Appendix.
Figure 6 shows the representative shapes of functions ζ(IM) and χ(IM). When
the size of investment is within an intermediate range, IA ∈ (ζ(IM),χ(IM)), the
technological shift discretely reduces the number of rent earners even though it in-
creases the amount of rent received by each entrepreneur.11 Such a concentration
11Strictly speaking, Proposition 4 requires an additional condition IM > IM . However, under
reasonable parameter values for αA, αM , and PM/PA, we found I is often close to PM or even
below PM . Since IM > PM , condition IM > IM is usually satisfied.
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of economic rents deteriorates welfare U ∗(λ) if agents have a suﬃciently high risk
aversion or, equivalently, their utility function u(·) is suﬃciently concave. To observe
this point, note that the technological shift caused by a marginal increase in λ af-
fects the steady state income distribution in three respects (see Figure 1(iii)). First,
the income of credit-rationed agents, rw∗(λ) increases only marginally. Second, the
number of entrepreneurs n∗(λ) falls discretely. Third, the amount of income received
by each entrepreneur ce∗(λ) rises discretely. The first eﬀect is marginal and is there-
fore dominated by the second and the third eﬀects. The change in the number of
entrepreneurs linearly aﬀects U∗(λ), while the increase in the entrepreneurs’ income
is subject to decreasing marginal utility. Therefore, when the degree of risk aversion
is suﬃciently high, the second eﬀect dominates. In this case, welfare U∗(λ) falls
discretely at λ = λsft.
This result can be interpreted as a certain type of crowding-out eﬀect. Note that
the rate of return from the capital-intensive technology responds less sensitively to
changes in the market wage, since it relies less on labor than labor-intensive tech-
nology. As a result, the borrowing constraint for technology M is less sensitive
to an increase in wt+1 than the borrowing constraint for technology A (see equa-
tion 22). Therefore, once financial infrastructure is improved to slightly above λsft,
entrepreneurs adopting the capital-intensive technology can attract workers by pay-
ing wage rates that are marginally higher than wages that could be oﬀered by en-
trepreneurs using the labor-intensive technology, within their respective borrowing
constraints. In eﬀect, entrepreneurs with labor-intensive technologies are crowded
out from the factor markets. Thus, even if the society as a whole does not want a
technological shift, people cannot stay with the old technology once the improved
financial infrastructure enables the adoption of the new technology.
7 Discussion: Policy Implications
Economic historians have documented many instances of social conflicts through the
process of economic development. Our model shows that such conflicts occur both
when inequality rises and falls. When a reform in the financial infrastructure enables
28
more agents to start businesses by adopting the existing technology, as in Case 1 in
the previous section, the degree of inequality falls and welfare improves. However,
since the income of the incumbent entrepreneurs falls due to increased competition,
they may act against the reform. In this case, the desirability of the reform is not a
question, but whether it can actually be carried out depends on the political process
(e.g., how disproportionately the incumbent entrepreneurs have political powers).
In contrast, when a reform in the financial infrastructure triggers a technological
shift, as in Case 3 in the previous section, the degree of inequality generally rises.
Nonetheless, the incumbent entrepreneurs again act against the reform since they
know that only a few of them will be able to adopt the new technology, while the
remaining will be driven out from the business. In this case, the desirability of the
reform is questionable. The non-implementation of reforms that are essential for
further development does not necessarily indicate problems in the political process
but can be a righteous decision by the society. If so, then, is there any remedy for
this “development trap?”
The following presents two examples of such a remedy. Recall that a technological
shift can be welfare reducing only when the minimum amount of investment for the
old technology is of a substantial size (i.e., IA ∈ (ζ(IM),χ(IM))). In reality, the
minimum size of the investment is determined not only by the technical aspects of
the technology but also by political and social constraints. For example, before the
French Revolution, the old urban guilds in continental Europe restricted new entrants
to their industry, eﬀectively maintaining at a IA high level. Mokyr (1990) documents
that in those days, the society chose to slow down the rate of technological progress
by a vast body of regulations and restrictions on inputs and outputs.
Based on our theory, one way to escape from this development trap is to facili-
tate the adoption of the currently used technology by small businesses so that the
minimum size of investment is reduced. Such a policy is beneficial even when one
does not consider a technological shift, since it weakens credit rationing and thereby
distributes the rent obtained by the incumbent entrepreneurs to workers (in fact, it
can be confirmed that the income of credit-rationed agents, rw∗(λ), increases as IA
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falls). Moreover, if the minimum size can be reduced to a level below the threshold
(specifically, when IA < ζ(IM)), credit rationing disappears, and the technological
shift is now Pareto improving.12 Therefore, even when the long-term object is to pro-
mote the adoption of the new technology, the immediate policy is to remove barriers
to the adoption of the currently used technology rather than the new technology. In
the above example of continental Europe, the French Revolution abolished guilds in
1791 and subsequently in areas that fell under French domination. After that, Europe
followed Britain in revolutionizing its production system. Even today, barriers to en-
try into the existing industries are substantial. Djankov et al. (2002) report that the
oﬃcial cost of following the procedures required to start up a simple firm averages 46
percent of annual per capita GDP in the world, with this number being systematically
high in low-income countries. Our theory implies that simplifications of procedures
in low-income countries would be essential to break free from the development trap.
The reduction of IA is thus quite eﬀective; however, there would be many instances
in which it cannot be reduced further. In that case, a second best policy suggested
by our analysis is to protect the currently used technology, or even to deter the
adoption of new technology, so that the technological shift does not occur until λt
becomes large enough to resolve credit rationing. Specifically, equation (17) shows
that credit rationing is resolved if the adoption of technologyM is somehow deterred
until λt reaches 1− wt/IA. Once this is accomplished, no party earns rents from the
current technology, and the adoption of the new technology is beneficial for every
agent. In the process of economic development after World War II, Okazaki (1996)
reported that the Japanese government subsidized small-scale firms with primitive
technologies while continually strengthening Japan’s financial infrastructure. Our
model confirms that this combination of policies was eﬀective in fostering economic
development while controlling social conflicts.
12Note that the threshold level of λ, given by Λ(wt) in (25), gets larger when IA is smaller. Thus,
when IA is small, the credit rationing immediately after shifting to technology M is not as strong
as when IA is large. This is another reason why a smaller IA makes the technological shift welfare
improving.
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8 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a model in which economic development is facilitated by improve-
ments in the financial infrastructure, such as the legal and accounting systems, and
their enforcements. As improved financial infrastructure strengthens enforcement of
financial contracts, the economy shifts from having a labor intensive technology to a
technology with a higher capital intensity. The technological shift discretely increases
the aggregate income, and at the same time, creates social conflicts since the incum-
bent entrepreneurs will lose the economic rent they are currently receiving. However,
this does not necessarily mean that the technological shift brings about more equality
in income distribution. In fact, the technological shift generally raises the degree of
inequality, and, under a certain condition, it concentrates the economic rents among
a smaller number of agents and reduces the average utility among all the agents.
This creates the possibility of a development trap, in which the society as a whole is
reluctant to improve its financial infrastructure for fear of causing a welfare-reducing
technological shift.
We found that the precise condition under which the concentration of rents ocuurs
is when the adoption of the currently used technology requires a considerable amount
of fixed costs, which can be associated with entry barriers (e.g., trade guilds or
complex procedures to set up a firm). This observation implies that a way to avoid
the welfare loss is to facilitate the adoption of the currently used, not new, technology
by small businesses. It even legitimizes the protection of current technology against
new technologies for some time while promoting the development of financial markets.
Such policies will gradually redistribute the rent received by existing entrepreneurs to
the broader population and thus mitigate the welfare loss and opposition associated
with the technological shift.
Does this mean that we should protect particular firms with vested interests in
the status quo, despite the conventional wisdom that they are obstacles to economic
development? No, it does not. Facilitating the adoption of the currently used tech-
nology by reducing the fixed cost actually decreases the income of the incumbent
firms using that technology since it increases competition. The same holds when the
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authority promotes the development of financial markets while deterring the adoption
of newer technologies. Our analysis suggests the importance of making a clear dis-
tinction between protecting a particular technology and protecting particular firms
that are connected to that technology.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we establish the existence of the equilibrium market wage at period t + 1, de-
noted simply by w, assuming as given the predetermined market wage of the previous
period wt. As explained in the text, minL
D
t+1(w;wt) > 1 for all w ∈ (w(λ), θt) and
LDt+1(w;wt) = {0} for all w > θt. Thus, the intermediate value theorem implies
the existence of w ∈ [θt, θt] such that LDt+1(w;wt) 3 1 if the graph of LDt+1(w;wt) is
jointed for all [Θ,Θ], where Θ and Θ are arbitrary constants with Θ ∈ (w(λ), θt) and
Θ > θ (note that we can always choose such constants since θ is finite and θt > w(λ)
from wt > 0). For this, it is suﬃcient to show that LDt+1(w;wt) is convex-valued,
non-empty, and upper hemi continuous (hereafter u.h.c.) for all w ∈ [Θ,Θ].
From the definition that LDt+1(w;wt) is an aggregation of individual labor demand,
its non-emptiness and convexity are obvious; there is a continuum of agents, and the
set of most preferred actions of each agent is convex-valued, non-empty and does not
depend on the action of others given w. It is also easy to see that set LDt+1(w;wt)
is compact. For any w ∈ [Θ,Θ], condition (6) implies that the size of investment of
each project is finite. Then, there exists a finite upper bound in labor demand L in
LDt+1(w;wt), from (2). Since L
D
t+1(w;wt) is closed by construction, it is compact.
According to the definition of Stokey and Lucas (1989, p. 56), a compact-valued
correspondence LDt+1 : [Θ,Θ] → [0, L] is u.h.c. at w∗, if, for every sequence {wn}
such that wn ∈ [Θ,Θ] and wn → w∗, and for every sequence {Ln} such that Ln ∈
LDt+1(wn;wt), there exists a convergent subsequence of {Ln} whose limit point L∗ is in
LDt+1(w
∗;wt). To show that LDt+1(·;wt) is u.h.c., fix w∗ ∈ [Θ,Θ] and pick any arbitrary
sequences {wn} and {Ln} such that wn ∈ [Θ,Θ], wn → w∗, and Ln ∈ LDt+1(wn;wt).
If
S∞
n=1wn is finite, there must be some N > 0 such that wn = w
∗ for all n ≥ N .
Then, since Ln ∈ LDt+1(w∗;wt) for all n ≥ N and LDt+1(w∗;wt) is compact, there is a
convergent subsequence of {Ln} whose limit point L∗ is in LDt+1(w∗;wt). Therefore,
the conditions for u.h.c. are satisfied.
The remainder of the case is that
S∞
n=1wn is infinite. Note that, since ρj(w)’s
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intersect with each other only a finite number of times, we can choose a subsequence
of {wn} so that each element in set {ρj(wn)}j∈J ∪ r has a distinct value, i.e., so
that there is always a strict ordering of profitability among technologies as well as
between investment and saving. Since the set of technologies J is finite, the number
of patterns in the ordering of profitability that possibly appear in that subsequence
is also finite. Therefore, there is at least one pattern of the strict ordering of prof-
itability that appears infinite times in sequence {wn}, from which we can construct
a subsequence wnk → w∗ such that
ρ1(wnk) < · · · < ρbj−1(wnk) < r < ρbj(wnk) < · · · < ρJ(wnk) for all k, (32)
where each of the available technologies is numbered in ascending order of profitabil-
ity. In this particular ordering, J is the number of technologies, and bj is the index of
the least profitable technology whose rate of return is higher than that on saving.
Let us derive LDt+1(wnk ;wt) using (32). Note that, from (5) and (7), it is optimal
for each agent to invest in the most profitable technology (that with the largest index)
under his specific borrowing constraint wt + ²it ≥ ηj(wnk ,λ) as long as there is such
a technology above bj. More specifically, he adopts technology j if and only if the
amount of his own funds is within the range of wt+ ²it ∈ Wj(wnk), where Wj(wnk) is
defined recursively for j = J, J − 1, . . . ,bj by
Wj(wnk) ≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[ηJ(wnk ,λ),∞) for j = J ;
[ηj(wnk ,λ),∞) \Wj+1(wnk) for j = J − 1, · · · ,bj.
From (10) and (14), an entrepreneur with own funds wt+²it demands e`j(wnk)(wt + ²it)
/(1− λρj(wnk)/r) units of labor whenever wt+ ²it ∈ Wj(wnk) for some j ≥ bj. Recall
that e`j(wnk) ≡ f 0−1j (wnk), which means that the individual labor demand is a value
rather than a set. Since ²it is distributed uniformly between 0 and ², the aggregate
labor demand is given by
JX
j=bj
Z
wt+²∈Ej(wnk ;wt)
(wt + ²)e`j(wnk)
1− λρj(wnk)/r
d²
²
≡ eLt+1(wnk ;wt), (33)
where set Ej(wnk ;wt) ≡ {² ∈ [0, ²]|wt+ ² ∈ Wj(wnk)} represents the range of random
incomes with which technology j is chosen. Note that eLt+1(wnk ;wt) is a function
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and, therefore, set LDt+1(wnk ;wt) has only one element. The only choice of sequence
{Lnk} is such that Lnk = eLt+1(wnk ;wt) for all k. When viewed as a correspondence,
Ej(w;wt) is well defined and continuous for all w ∈ [Θ,Θ]. From (33), functioneLt+1(w;wt) is also well defined and continuous for all w ∈ [Θ,Θ]. Thus, given that
wnk ∈ [Θ,Θ] converges to w∗, Lnk = eLt+1(wnk ;wt) converges to L∗ ≡ eLt+1(w∗;wt).
The final task is to show that L∗ ∈ LDt+1(w∗;wt). Consider the relative profitability
of each technology when the market wage is given by w∗. Since ρj(w) is continuous,
taking limit wnk → w∗ in (32) implies
ρ1(w∗) ≤ · · · ≤ ρbj−1(w∗) ≤ r ≤ ρbj(w∗) ≤ · · · ≤ ρJ(w∗). (34)
In the limit, we only have a weak ordering of profitability. Nonetheless, agents
with own funds ²it ∈ Wj(w∗) for some j ≥ bj find it at least weakly optimal to
choose technology j, while other agents find it at least weakly optimal to save. Thus,
LDt+1(w
∗;wt) 3 eLt+1(w∗;wt) = L∗. This establishes that LDt+1(w;wt) is u.h.c. at
w = w∗. Since w∗ ∈ [Θ,Θ] is arbitrary, the correspondence LDt+1(w;wt) is u.h.c. for
all w ∈ [Θ,Θ]. This completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of parts a and b. Those properties are directly obtained by taking limit ²→ 0
in Proposition 1.
Proof of part c. Given technology j∗, credit rationing occurs if borrowing constraint
(10) is stronger than profitability constraint (8). A comparison of these conditions
gives Bj∗(wt,λ) < Pj∗ ⇔ wt < (1− λ)Ij∗.
Proof of part d. The following derives the income distribution when credit rationing
occurs. Note that, from the continuity of function Bj(·) for all j, we can choose
suﬃciently small ² > 0 such that θ(wt + ²it,λ) = Bj∗(wt + ²it,λ) for all ²it ∈ [0, ²].
Then, Proposition 1 states that wt+1 ∈ [Bj∗(wt,λ), Bj∗(wt + ²,λ)] or, equivalently,
ηj∗(wt+1,λ) ∈ [wt, wt + ²] from (9). Now, consider the limiting case in which the
degree of heterogeneity ² is infinitesimally small (² → 0). In the limit, the pre-
vious relationships indicate wt+1 → Bj∗(wt,λ) and ηj∗(wt+1,λ) → wt. Applying
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these for (14) shows that the limiting value of labor demand by any entrepreneur is
Ij∗ e`j∗(Bj∗(wt,λ)). Since the total labor demand should be 1 in equilibrium, it sug-
gests that the number of entrepreneurs in the limit is
³
Ij∗ e`j∗(Bj∗(wt,λ))´−1 , which
is smaller than the number of agents, 1, under Assumption 1. Similarly, taking the
limit in (15) and eliminating Bj∗(·) by (10) show that the limiting value of consump-
tion of entrepreneurs is rwt+ r((1− λ)Ij∗ −wt)/λ, where the second term is positive
since wt < (1− λ)Ij∗ from part c. ¥
Lemma 1 and Proof
In this appendix, we formally establish the four properties discussed in subsection
6.1. Recall that we have assumed PM > PA. In the following, we assume a slightly
stronger version, PM/PA ≥ 1/(1−αM), in order to reduce the number of cases to be
analyzed without aﬀecting the main findings.
Lemma 1 Let j∗(λ) and w∗(λ) denote the choice of technology and wage rate at the
lowest steady state. Suppose that PM/PA ≥ 1/(1−αM) and that increases in λ do not
cause j∗(λ) ∈ {A,M} to change more than twice.13 Then, the following properties
hold:
a. For any λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists w∗(λ) ∈ (0, PM ]. In addition, if wt ≤ w∗(λ) for
some t, then wt converges to w
∗(λ).
b. There exists λsft ∈ (0, 1) such that j∗(λ) = A if λ < λsft and j∗(λ) =M if λ > λsft.
c. w∗(λ) is weakly increasing in λ; in addition, it is continuous at λ = λsft.
d. w∗(λsft) < PA whenever IA > ζ(IM).
Proof of part a. As shown by Figure 2, 0 < w(λ) ≤ θ(w,λ) ≤ PM for all w ≥ 0 from
the definition of function θ(·,λ) in (12) and the assumption that PM > PA. Therefore,
13By this technical assumption, we ignore an unlikely possibility of temporarily shifting back
to the old, labor-intensive technology as a result of improvements in the financial infrastructure.
Specifically, for this assumption to be violated, functions B∗A(w) and B
∗
M (w) have multiple points
of intersection in the range of w ∈ (0, PA), which we numerically found to occur only for a very
narrow range of parameters.
36
θ(0,λ) − 0 > 0 ≥ θ(PM ,λ) − PM . Since θ(w,λ) − w is continuous with respect to
w, the intermediate value theorem shows that there is at least one w ∈ (0, PM ] such
that θ(w,λ)− w = 0, the smallest of which is denoted by w∗(λ).
Note that θ(w,λ) − w > 0 for all w ∈ [0, w∗(λ)). Suppose that wt ∈ [0, w∗(λ)).
Then wt follows wt+1 = θ(w,λ) > wt and thus gets higher overtime. In addition,
since θ(w,λ) is weakly increasing in w, wt+1 = θ(wt,λ) ≤ θ(w∗(λ),λ) = w∗(λ), which
means that wt never exceeds w
∗(λ). Therefore, wt converges to w∗(λ) whenever
wt ≤ w∗(λ) for some t. ¥
Proof of part b. Define h(λ) ≡ Λ(w∗(λ))− λ. Then, (25) implies that j∗(λ) = A
if h(λ) > 0 and j∗(λ) = M if h(λ) < 0. From (23), (24), (25), and PM > PA,
it follows that Λ(0) = Λ2(0) = (PA/PM)
1/(bαM−bαA) > 0 and that Λ(w) ≤ Λ1(w) ≤
(PA/PM)
1/bαM < 1 for any w > 0. Using these, we first show that j∗(λ) = A if
λ is suﬃciently small. From (22), as λ → 0, Bj(w,λ) → 0 for every j and w
and, therefore, θ(w,λ) → 0 for all w from (12). Then, w∗(λ) = θ(w∗(λ),λ) → 0.
Therefore, limλ→0 h(λ) = Λ(0) − 0 = (PA/PM)1/(bαM−bαA) > 0, which means that
limλ→0 j∗(λ) = A. Conversely, limλ→1 h(λ) = Λ(1) − 1 ≤ (PA/PM)1/bαM − 1 < 0,
which implies that limλ→1 j∗(λ) = M . Since we are considering the situation in
which j∗(λ) does not change more than twice, it immediately follows that there is
a unique threshold λsft ∈ (0, 1) such that j∗(λ) = A if λ < λsft and j∗(λ) = M if
λ > λsft. ¥
Proof of part c. Choose arbitrary λ1,λ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that λ1 < λ2 and suppose
that w∗(λ1) > w∗(λ2). Since w < θ(w,λ1) for all w < w∗(λ1), as shown in part
a, we have w∗(λ2) < θ(w∗(λ2),λ1). Recall that θ(w,λ) is weakly increasing with
respect to λ, as can be confirmed from its definition (12). Then, θ(w∗(λ2),λ1) ≤
θ(w∗(λ2),λ2) = w∗(λ2). Combining the above two results yields w∗(λ2) < w∗(λ2),
which is a contradiction. Therefore, w∗(λ) is weakly increasing.
For later use, we prove that if the BM curve crosses the 45 degree line at w ≤ PA,
then its slope at the intersecting point is less than one. Diﬀerentiating BM(w,λ)
with respect to w and equating BM(wt,λ) with w show that the gradient is less
than one whenever w < (1 − αM)IM . Since the parameters satisfy IM > PM and
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(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 7: Contradictions
PM ≥ PA/(1 − αM) (as assumed at the beginning of this appendix), this property
holds for all w ≤ PA ≤ (1− αM)PM < (1− αM)IM .
Using this property, now we prove the continuity of w∗(λ) at λsft. Suppose that
contrary to our claim, w∗(λ) increases discretely at λsft. Since the θ curve shifts
upward continuously with λ, such a jump means that the θ curve is tangent to the
45 degree curve at w∗(λsft) when λ = λsft. Note that w∗(λsft) ∈ (0, PA] is implied by
the continuity of θ curve with respect to w and λ. In addition, w∗(λsft) cannot be PA
since it is impossible for the θ curve to be tangent to the 45 degree line at PA given
that the slope of BM curve is less than one on the 45 degree line (See Figure 7(i)).
Therefore, w∗(λsft) ∈ (0, PA). This implies that BM(PA,λsft) must be smaller than
PA since, otherwise, the BM curve is above the 45 degree line for all (0, PA) and so
is the θ curve, contradicting the premise that w∗(λ) ∈ (0, PA) is a steady state (See
Figure 7(ii)). However, if BM(PA,λsft) < PA, then θ(PA,λsft) = PA, which means
that PA is the second smallest steady state (See Figure 7(iii)). In that case, a slight
increase in λ lets w∗(λ) jump to PA, where j∗(λ) = A still holds. This contradicts
the definition of λsft, proving that the jump assumed at the beginning cannot occur.
¥
Proof of part d. Let us first consider the timing at which the borrowing constraint
get resolved under technology A, by tentatively assuming that only technology A is
available. Similarly to the first half of the proof of part c, it can be shown that w∗(λ)
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is weakly increasing in λ. Then, there is a unique bλ ∈ (0, 1) such that
w∗(λ) < PA for all λ < bλ; w∗(bλ) = PA. (35)
This means that the borrowing constraint for technology A resolves in steady state
when λ = bλ. Note that, from property c of Proposition 2, bλ ≥ 1− PA/IA holds.
Now we show that the economy shifts to technology M before λ reaches bλ, under
the assumption that IA > ζ(IM). Manipulations using (24) show that the condition
IA > ζ(IM) is equivalent to Λ2(PA) < 1− PA/IA. From the definition of Λ(·) in (25)
and the property of bλ obtained above, it follows that Λ(PA) ≤ Λ2(PA) < 1−PA/IA ≤bλ. We have seen above that if the economy has not shifted to technology M , the
steady state when λ = bλ is wt = wt+1 = PA. However, the derived inequality
Λ(PA) ≤ bλ means that the economy has already shifted to technologyM when λ = bλ
and wt = PA. This means that the economy shifts to technology M before the credit
rationing resolves. Therefore, w∗(λsft) < PA. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of part a. Recall that λ = B∗j (w) holds in any steady state with credit rationing,
where B∗j (w) is defined in (26). Using it to eliminate λ from (28) and (30) shows
that the number of entrepreneurs and the aggregate consumption can be written as
a function of the steady state wage w and technology j:
N ss(j, w) ≡bαjw1/bαj ³rIjP 1/bαjj ´−1 , (36)
Css(j, w) ≡rw + bαjw ³1− (w/Pj)1/bαj´ . (37)
Although the above is derived by assuming that the economy is with credit rationing,
(37) still gives the right amount of aggregate consumption even when there is no credit
rationing: i.e., Css(j, Pj) = rPj. Therefore, C
∗(λ) = Css(j∗(λ), w∗(λ)) holds for all
λ.
Suppose that λ is below λsft, in which case, j∗(λ) = A from Lemma 1. The slope
of C∗(λ) is then given by
dC∗(λ)
dλ
=
dCss(A,w∗(λ))
dw
· dw
∗(λ)
dλ
. (38)
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Diﬀerentiating (37) shows that the first term in the RHS is r+bαA−(1+bαA)(w∗(λ)/PA)1/bαA
≥ 0, where the inequality follows from r ≥ 1 and w∗(λ) ≤ PA. Lemma 1 shows that
the second term in (38) is also nonnegative. Therefore, C∗(λ) is weakly upward-
sloping for all λ ∈ (0,λsft). The same argument applies when λ ∈ [λsft, 1), except
that A should be replaced by M , which proves that C∗(λ) is weakly upward-sloping
in that range as well. The remaining task is to prove that C∗(λ) does not decrease at
the threshold λsft. Applying bαA < bαM and PA < PM to the definition of Css(j, w) in
(37) shows that Css(A,w) ≤ Css(M,w) for any w. In addition, w∗(λ) is continuous
at the threshold. Therefore, the left-hand limit limλ→λsft−0C
∗(λ) = Css(A,w∗(λsft))
is lower than C∗(λsft) = Css(M,w∗(λsft)). ¥
Proof of part b. Substituting (36) and (37) for (31) gives the Gini coeﬃcient in
the steady state as G(j, w,B∗j (w)) = (1 − N ss(j, w))(1 − rw/Css(j, w)) ≡ Gss(j, w).
Note that N ss(j, w) is increasing in w and that rw/Css(j, w) = [1 + (bαj/r)(1 −
(w/Pj)
1/bαj)]−1 is decreasing in w, which, together, imply that Gss(j, w) is decreasing
in w. When λ ∈ (0,λsft), G∗(λ) = Gss(A,w∗(λ)), from Lemma 1. It is weakly
decreasing in λ, since a rise in λ weakly increases w∗(λ), from Lemma 1, which
weakly decreases Gss(j, w∗(λ)), as shown above. The same argument applies for the
case of λ ∈ [λsft, 1), except that A should be replaced by M . ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
If IA ≤ ζ(IM), there is no credit rationing and the number of rent earners before
the technological shift is zero. Therefore it is suﬃcient to consider only the case of
IA > ζ(IM), for which case the economy is credit constrained both before and after
the technological shift. Then, we can use (36) and write the steady state number
of entrepreneurs at levels of enforcement slightly below and above the threshold as
N ss(A,wsft) and N ss(M,wsft), respectively, where wsft ≡ w∗(λsft) denote the steady
state wage at the threshold.
Let Q denote the ratio of these two numbers. Using (36),
Q ≡ N
ss(M,wsft)
N ss(A,wsft)
=
bαMbαA IA(w
sft/PA)
1/bαA
IM(wsft/PM)1/bαM . (39)
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Our concern is whether Q ≥ 1 or Q < 1. Note that the continuity of the steady-state
wage at the threshold means that B∗A(w
sft) = λsft = B∗M(w
sft), where B∗j (·) is given
by (26). Using this relationship, (39) can be simplified as
Q =
bαMbαA IA − w
sft
IM − wsft
. (40)
From assumptions Ij > Pj and PM > PA, it follows that both IA−wsft and IM −wsft
are positive, guaranteeing Q > 0. Moreover, it is implied that Q > 1 whenever
IA ≥ IM (recall that bαA < bαM).
Let us examine how Q responds to changes in IA when IA < IM . Diﬀerentiating
(40) with respect to IA gives
dQ
dIA
=
bαMbαA(IM − wsft)2
∙
(IM − wsft)− (IM − IA)
dwsft
dIA
¸
, (41)
the sign of which depends on that of dwsft/dIA. Note that function B
∗
A(w) and
function Λ(w) intersect at the point (λsft, wsft), as shown by Figure 4(ii). Equations
(26) and (25) show that with an increase in IA, B
∗
A(w) shifts to the right, whereas
Λ(w) shifts to the left, pushing the intersecting point downward. This means that
dwsft/dIA < 0 and, therefore, dQ/dIA > 0 from (41).
We confirmed that Q > 1 when IA = IM and that it gradually decreases as IA falls
for all IA > ζ(IM). If limIA→ζ(IM )Q < 1, the intermediate value theorem shows that
there exists a value of IA below which Q < 1 holds. We now calculate the limiting
value. From the definition ζ(IM) and the continuity of wsft with respect to IA, observe
that wsft → PA when IA → ζ(IM) (i.e., the point of technological shift approaches
region PA, where w = PA). Substituting it into Q = N
ss(M,wsft)/N ss(A,wsft) and
using the definition of ζ(IM) in (27) show
lim
IA→ζ(IM )
Q =
bαMbαA
µ
PA
PM
¶1/bαM ζ(IM)
IM
Q 1 ⇔ IM R I.
Therefore, given that IM > IM , there exists χ(IM) ∈ (ζ(IM), IM) such that Q < 1 for
IA ∈ (ζ(IM),χ(IM)). Finally, since Q is continuous with respect to IM from (40), the
implicit function theorem guarantees that the value of IA at which Q = 1 changes
continuously with respect to IM > IM and approaches ζ(IM) as IM → IM . This
indicates the continuity of function χ(IM). ¥
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